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1 Introduction
Ultrafilters arise frequently in the social choice literature and surrounding fields
as collections of the decisive set for a given aggregation procedure. We know
from [8] that we can associate each Arrow social welfare function with an ultra-
filter. Because of their structure, ultrafilters are useful in analyses of both finite
and infinite voting populations.
For an infinite set of voters, [5] demonstrated that given a society with an
infinite population, the non-dictatorship condition of Arrow’s general possibility
theorem is satisfied, in that there is no single voter whose preferences dictate the
outcome of the election. Similar results regarding non-dictatorship in infinite
populations have been proven in the fields of judgment aggregation as well [4].
Less attention has been paid to the study of the comparison of societies with
infinite populations. One of the first efforts to do so was made by [12], utilizing
the Rudin-Keisler order over ultrafilters. After this, however, little further work
has been undertaken.
In this paper, we focus on the study of the relationship between societies
with countably infinite voters. Thus, for a given population, the cardinality of
the population of voters in our society is equal to the cardinality of the natural
numbers: |V | = |N|.
In this process of comparison, a natural question to ask would be if all sets
of decisive voters (ultrafilters) over N are isomorphic, and thus fundamentally
similar. To answer this, we present the following theorem due to [10]:
Theorem 1. There are exactly 2(2
ℵ0) non-principal ultrafilters on N.
Given this, we see that there are too few permutations for all nonprincipal
ultrafilters to be isomorphic, and thus we can begin in earnest the process of
comparison.
To this end, in this short paper, we introduce to the social choice literature
the notion of the Rudin-Frolik ordering, which allows for the ordering of societies
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based on the structure of the set of decisive coalitions and is stronger than the
Rudin-Keisler ordering used in [12]. We then prove a theorem regarding the
invisible dictators of [8] using the Rudin-Frolik ordering.
2 Framework and Definitions
First, we give the canonical definition of an ultrafilter as it arises in the social
choice literature:
Definition 2.1. Take X as a set and P(X) as the power set of X . We shall
call a family of sets, U ⊆ P(X), an ultrafilter on X if:
• ∅ 6∈ U
• X ∈ U
• If A ∪B ∈ U , then either A ∈ U or B ∈ U .
• For A,B ∈ U , A ∩B ∈ U
• If A ∈ U and A ⊂ B, then B ∈ U
• For any A ∈ X , either A ∈ U or X −A ∈ U .
Closely related to the notion of an ultrafilter is that of a limit along an
ultrafilter, which gives a generalized method for taking the limit of sequences in
compact spaces:
Definition 2.2. Take U as an ultrafilter over N and take f : N → X to be a
mapping giving a sequence of elements in a compact space X . Then, we can
define a limit of f(n) along U as the unique point, a, such that:
a = lim
n→U
f(n) ∈ X
given that if U is an open neighborhood containing a, then f−1(U) ∈ U . Thus,
we can think of the sequence as having been indexed by the natural numbers
such that the sets of indices f−1(U) = {n ∈ N : f(n) ∈ U} of the elements of
f(n) that are mapped into U must be contained in U .
We refer readers to [14] for a proof of the above mentioned limit’s existence and
uniqueness.
Using the generalized limit given to us in the previous definition, we can
construct a compactification of the natural numbers. We will use this space,
called the Stone-Cech compactification and written as βN, as the topological
grounding for our investigation of invisible dictatorships.
Definition 2.3. The Stone-Cech compactification of N is a topological space
that has the following properties:
1. N ⊂ βN
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2. βN is a compact Hausdorff space.
3. N is dense in βN.
4. For any map f : N→ Y , where Y is a compact space, there exists a unique
continuous extension of f which maps βN to Y , written as f : βN→ Y .
We can view βN as the set of all ultrafilters on N, with the principal ultra-
filters corresponding to the elements of N. To see the proof of this equivalence,
we refer the reader to [13].
[8] situate their investigation and proof of existence of invisible dictatorship
in the Stone-Cech compactification of N. Importantly, this means that condition
3 of Definition 2.3 implies that for every situation, f , of possible combinations
of individual preferences, there exists a continuous extension of f which maps
the space of compactified voters to the space of all weak orders, P, on the set
of alternatives, X . For this to be the case, however, we must restrict X and P
to the finite case and then endow P with the discrete topology.
Finally, we revise briefly the notation and conditions of Arrow’s general
possibility theorem, as they appear in [8]:
We write |X | for the number of alternatives, V as the space of voters, f as
a function from V to P (which again is the set of all weak orders over X), F
as the set of all f , and σ (a social welfare function) as a mapping which assigns
each f ∈ F to a weak order σ(f) in P.
Theorem 2. Arrow’s general possibility theorem finds that for a finite popula-
tion, a social welfare function cannot satisfy the following conditions:
• |X | ≥ 3
• σ is a function on F into P
• For all a, b ∈ X, af(V )b⇒ aσ(f)b
• For all a, b ∈ X and f, g ∈ F , f = g on {a, b} ⇒ σ(f) = σ(g) on {a, b}
• There is no v0 ∈ V such that , for all a, b ∈ X and f ∈ F , af(v0)b ⇒
aσ(f)b
As stated earlier, we restrict our attention to the case of countably infinite
voters, so |V | = N, and thus (when applicable) write N to indicate V .
3 Main Results
[8] defines the concept of invisible dictatorship as a social welfare function, σ,
that violates the following condition:
Proposition. There is no U ∈ βV such that, for all a, b ∈ X and f ∈ F ,
af(U)b⇒ aσ(f)b
where βV is the Stone-Cech compactification of the space of voters, V .
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In [8], the invisible dictator is the limit point of the hierarchy that decides the
outcome of the social welfare function; thus, the preferences of U are the limit
preferences of those in the hierarchy. Formally, we write that U is the limit in βN
of an ultrafilter, U ∈ N. U is characterized as a point in the compactified space of
voters; however, given that we are working in the Stone-Cech compactification
of N, we can also characterize U as an ultrafilter over N.
Interpreting βN as the set of all ultrafilters over N, we can partition βN
into two sets: dictatorships, corresponding to principal ultrafilters over N, and
invisible dictatorships, corresponding to nonprincipal ultrafilters over N.
However, we can differentiate the points of βN further, using the Rudin-
Frolik ordering:
Definition 3.1. The Rudin-Frolik ordering, denoted by ⊑, is a partial ordering1
on the ultrafilters in βN such that for U ,W ∈ βN, U ⊑ W if and only if there is
a one-to-one function, f : N→ βN, such that the set {f(n) : n ∈ N} is discrete2
and f¯(U) =W .
Before proving our first theorem, we state a lemma regarding the structure
of the Rudin-Frolik ordering:
Definition 3.2. We a define a relation using ⊑ such that, for U ,W ∈ βN, if
U ⊑ W and W ⊑ U , then we write U ≡RF W
Lemma 1. ≡RF is an equivalence relation on the ultrafilters over N.
Proof. See [3].
First, we demonstrate that the Rudin-Frolik order coincides with the differ-
entiation between points in βN we have already constructed, the differentiation
between dictatorial and invisibly dictatorial social welfare functions:
Theorem 3. Those ultrafilters associated with dictatorial social welfare func-
tions are minimal on the Rudin-Frolik ordering
Proof. As shown in [8], the ultrafilters that correspond to the decisive coalitions
of dictatorial social welfare functions are principal ultrafilters. Thus, we must
show that principal ultrafilters are minimal on Rudin-Frolik ordering over βN.
For proof of this, we refer the readers to [11].
The Rudin-Frolik order is useful not only in separating dictatorial aggrega-
tion procedures from invisibly dictatorial procedures–it also allows us to differ-
entiate between invisibly dictatorial rules. The position of an ultrafilter on the
Rudin-Frolik order indicates its “level of dictatorship,” based on its proximity
to principal ultrafilters. Intuitively, we suspect that the closer the structure of
1We define a partial order on a set as a relation that has the properties of reflexivity,
antisymmetry, and transitivity.
2We define a family of points S as discrete if and only if each point x ∈ S has a neighborhood
U such that the intersection of S and U contains only {x}.
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a (nonprincipal) ultrafilter is to a principal ultrafilter, the more dictatorial it is
likely to be.
We can formalize this intuition with the following discussion of weak P-
points, an equivalence class on βN under ≡RF :
Definition 3.3. Given the topological space βN, a point V ∈ βN is called a
weak P-point if V is not contained in the closure of any countable subset of
βN\{V}.
Given that we are working in the compact Hausdorff space βN, we can
translate this definition to imply that if V ∈ βN is a weak P-point, then V is
never the limit of a countable (non-trivial) sequence of other ultrafilters in βN.
Because we are working in a countably infinite population, the preferences
we are concerned with aggregating can only manifest themselves as countable
sequences: the invisible dictatorships over N will only be limit of countably
many voters in a hierarchy.
To see formally the structural similarity between principal ultrafilters and
weak P-points, consider the process of construction of invisible dictatorships
provided in [8]. A given σ is first associated with the ultrafilter over N, repre-
senting its corresponding set of decisive voters, which is subsequently associated
with its unique limit in βN.
Theorem 4. For both principal ultrafilters and weak P-points, if U is a principal
ultrafilter or weak P-point, then U = U .
Proof. Consider first if U is a principal ultrafilter. We then see that U corre-
sponds directly to a decisive set of voters in N, the singleton {x} which de-
termines U . From [8], we know {x} corresponds directly to a social welfare
function, and its corresponding ultrafilter U over N, and so we have U = U .
Consider now if U is a weak P-point. We know that U = limv→U U . Because
U is a weak P-point, we know it cannot be the limit of any countable sequence
of ultrafilters in βN. Because U ∈ N, and N ⊂ βN, then we know that U cannot
be the limit of U in βN, unless U = U .
One could reasonably think that all points contained in βN\N3 are weak P-
points; if this is the case, then our revelation concerning “levels of dictatorship”
is not quite as helpful as initially imagined, However, the following theorem
demonstrates that there do exist points in βN that are “less dictatorial” than
weak p-points:
Theorem 5. [9] There exists a point W ∈ βN\N such that W is the limit point
of a countable discrete set and the countable sets of which W is the limit point
of comprise a filter.
Thus, in the construction of invisible dictatorships, it is not necessarily the case
that W is identified with the ultrafilter over N that it is the limit of, as is the
case with principal ultrafilters and weak P-points.
3 To denote the set of nonprincipal ultrafilters on βN, we write βN\N.
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As the above theorem demonstrates, weak P-points are structurally more
similar to principal ultrafilters than other ultrafilters in βN. Furthermore, on
the Rudin-Frolik order, they are the most structurally similar nonprincipal ul-
trafilters to principal ultrafilters in βN, thanks to the following theorem:
Theorem 6. The ultrafilters minimal on the Rudin-Frolik ordering over βN\N
are characterized as weak P-points.
Proof. See [2].
Finally, the following two theorems allow us to understand the structure of
the Rudin-Frolik ordering:
Theorem 7. If U ⊏W, then U 6=W.
Theorem 8. 1. V ⊏ U ⊏W implies V ⊏W
2. {U : U ⊏W} is a linearly ordered set. 4
Proof. See [2].
The linear ordering of the predecessors of an ultrafilter on the Rudin-Frolik
order suggests the possibility of constructing a method of quantifying the “level
of dictatorship” of aggregation procedures, based on their proximity on the
Rudin-Frolik ordering to dictatorial aggregation procedures.
Given the one-to-one correspondence between ultrafilters and the set of de-
cisive coalitions of certain aggregation procedures beyond the specific circum-
stances of social welfare functions, it seems that a potentially fruitful direc-
tion of research is to interpret theories concerning ultrafilters in the context of
preference aggregation further. Additionally, another avenue for generalization
opens: because we present results based on the structural properties of ultra-
filters, our results can be applied to domains concerning aggregation outside of
social welfare theory in which ultrafilters arise, such as judgment aggregation
or fields within computational social choice. Furthermore, though we deal only
with situations involving a finite number of alternatives in this paper, given the
work of [6], a suitable generalization to the case of infinite alternatives may be
achieved.
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